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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff/Appel lee, i " - - QrtfURl 
v , s 
AARON OLSEN, i -Priority No, 2 
Defendant/ Appellant• : 
BRIEF Ul'' APPELI..KK • 
JURlSDlC'llbU AMJ NATURE Ul PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Aaron ulsen appeals his conviction nf 
aggravated robbery, in violation of Utah Code Ann \ ui-^ --02 
( 11"'! i l l | i II in in I  i l e y i p t • 1 1 ' Li HI | , «-«n I fci i mi."i 1 i i | . i i i "erch i:t ^ 
Second Jud i" i e I District Court, in and hi County, 
Honorable Stanton M Tiiy 1 ni , pII'PS I d i in| I 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann, t, 'B 2-2 (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1 p i I il 1 he lack of a f or-cause challenge to a single 
prospective juror, who was then peremptorily challenged by 
c l i j f e i n d f i i II II • • • in II II i ' i I 11n" i ' 1 1 II a 1 1 1 i > i 1 1 i " "j • • ' i v e 
assistance . counself" such that defendant convictxw should 
be reversed? (responding to Point- < * ^  * Appellant). 
counsel Ineffectiveness claims present questions of law, reviewed 
on the trial record. Both such c'lainis h o — -
i-idrly idisiuti tin affirmatively demonstrate v,\.. : 
error and resulting prejudice. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 
(Utah 1989) (explaining both doctrines). 
2. Did the trial court properly admit eyewitness 
identification of defendant by the robbery victim, even though 
there was some uncertainty in that identification? In State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991), this question of 
constitutional due process was identified as one of law, reviewed 
nondeferentially; however, the relevant underlying fact findings 
are reviewed only for "clear error." Even so, "on occasion, the 
legal standard for admissibility of evidence vests a measure of 
discretion in the trial court." Id., at 781 n.3. 
3. Did the trial court properly admit statements of an 
alleged co-conspirator as evidence against defendant? As set 
forth in defendant's brief, this question, dealing with a rule of 
evidence, is reviewed under a deferential, "clear error" 
standard. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The texts of pertinent constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and rules will be set forth as needed in the body of 
this brief, or appended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery and 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery (R. 49-50).1 The 
conspiracy charge was dismissed at the close of the State's trial 
*The main record is designated "R." "T." refers to the 
transcript of the August 1990 trial. "T. 8/20/90" refers to the 
hearing of defendant's pretrial motion in limine. 
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evidence (R, SB T", "I "I | ; Mini,'" Jury subsequent! y found defendant 
g ui i, 1 1 y 11« I I1"1! ,!| yi r a v a I. t, \ I i, o 1 ) b e i; y (ill «( , "' ,1 ) ' U: c o r d i n g 1 y ,- d e f e I i d t.!i in t w a s 
sentenced to a term of five years to life at the Utah State 
Prison, pi HIS a consecutive one Yea,!" weapon enhancement (R II 00 ) 
Upon timel} iiutice (III I! I'll I) tins appeal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"I Iiip f riif I h ii i H p i . - - , i m | l l i e 
verdict. See State v. Verde, 2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989), 
The Cadillac Robber 
: 
d r i v e r J .C M o u i l l e waw about, t o put twu m a i l b a g s .: i \ h i s 
" f e e d e r t r u c k " a t t h e Ogden UPS r e n t e r ~u" y' h e a r d a 
I l l I  i mi i mi mi in in i I i l l i mi u in II I i n 1 > in in mi in in in mi in in 1 1 1 D r a n a i s n i n c 
p i s t o l |T i" ' P o i n t i n g t h e p i s t o l a t M o u i l l e ' s f a c e , t h e man 
a n n o u n c e d , I 'm g o i n g t o shoo t you,, m o t h e r fucker* | I 'H-Mll i . 
h I 1 hough iL was ddiJ i , MuuiLlu s t u d i e d t h e robbe j a s he 
a p p r o a c h e d w i t h i n f i v e or s i x feet | I I l | M o u i l l e d e s c r i b e d 
I I I III lllllll i l 1 1 1 II I III ( I I I III I I I > l i III III II 111 I III I III III III II l . u f l III f | ' | 1 ' I i i | III i II l H i l l III l l r l 1 II f I ' l l 
and e i t h e i cleaii-fahdveii ui wiLllii minimal b e a r d growtli | I L08-1U) 
The r o b b e r wore a long v e s t , a p p a r e n t l y open # t h a t made him 
appen in hi in iiiiiii | il, I I I "I |i 
/il t h e l u b b e r ' s d i r e c t i o n , Moui l l e mcved t o w a r d 
back of t h e f e e d e r ** ;-K d r o p p i n g t h e m a i l bags 
Ho s i d e s ma i - c e i p t s , eht? \ -
2The a r r e s t r e p o r t i n d i c a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t i s f ive 
n i n e i n c h e s t a J ] , w e i g h t ] 60 p o u n d s , b l o n d - h a i r e d (R. 1 
3 
$16,000 cash (T. 91-92, 139, 141, 343). The robber seized the 
bags, ordering Mouille to lie on the ground and not look at him 
(T. 99)* Mouille laid down, but continued to watch the robber as 
he ran away with the two mail bags (T. 99-100). 
As the robber fled, Mouille saw and hailed another UPS 
employee, Mike Harris, who was driving a UPS "package car" (T. 
101-02). Mouille told Harris about the robbery, and went to call 
the police; Harris pursued the robber (T. 102, 121). Harris saw 
the robber running away with the two UPS mail bags (T. 122). He 
took his eyes off the robber for an instant to talk to Mouille, 
then saw a car leave the area where the robber had been headed 
(T. 121, 126). Believing that the robber had entered the car, 
Harris pursued it (T. 123, 131-33). 
The getaway car was distinctive—new looking, shiny, 
four doors, shortened trunk—appearing to Harris as "something 
like a Cadillac" (T. 122). He later matched the car to a 
Cadillac Seville at a local dealership (T. 372). Harris followed 
the Cadillac in his large, slow UPS package car, but was unable 
to keep up (T. 123). Before finally losing contact, Harris heard 
two "pops," like gunshots, from the Cadillac. It then turned 
left at a red light, causing Harris to lose it (T. 124). 
An Inside Job 
A UPS investigator, working with the police, quickly 
determined that the robbery had elements of an "inside job." Of 
the eight to ten feeder trucks passing through the Ogden UPS 
center on any given day, only one would be carrying cash. 
4 
Because he correctly hit. Mi JIJ I J 11 •" i» I rink, it was apparent that 
the robber had inside information abou* wh i« h truck would be 
carry 1 ng I In- day's rnr\ i Ill V'i 
Two UFb clerks placed defendant in the Ogden UPS center 
within two weeks, perhaps only days, betore the robbery (T. H I?"
 r 
I T h e y i* P r c» 1i' 11111 11M -1 m 11 |,»in em i B I- • t 
o n e e v e n i n g a f t e r t h e customei ^ 1 e,i lidtl closed I  Il I) He 
perused the truck loading area for mi while, then asked one 
, | |T I'M J J, ). 
Additionally, Cary Nich i •=. Powell, who, like 
defendant, would bo^ * * r^ ?*-ed for Uv- — *~y,..
 (. . _~. . e e n 
. . i some wf. „ , i
 XJ roiDDery 
Nichols, •;* worked *-\ ,;i:v 'PS 
center (T. 202- ad said tha* a 
--j " WPP? * ,_ *:: .: , ,,e . ryjMK?* ~. *<> tn.ed for 
UPS (T, 187-89, 337-38 1 Also before the Ogden robbers Nichols 
II in in I  i i r-}{pt\ i i mi mi i w o r ki-' i i u I 
u n u s u a l " q u e s t ' " > >• about i n« uaxiuling of cash (T. 216-17) , 
The Break 
bag, conta*..:.;.u >jrt receipts and monej . i> -a was* found : 
postal employees on the ground ->f the Provo post office |T 57, 
1! 15 1 ) T h e • I: a g i ; a s 11 ir i led i II II i III I r i n \' e s 1 1 g a t o t
 i w ho 
identified its contents as among the items stolen In the Ogden 
UPS robbery; the $16,000 cash was missir 
5 
However, the bag also contained a business card for 
LeeAnn Leavitt (T. 342-43, 354, 249). The card had fingerprints, 
one of which proved to be defendant's (T. 393). A note was 
penned on the card to somebody named Troy (T. 353-54), who turned 
out to be Troy Powell. 
Talking to LeeAnn Leavitt, investigators learned that 
Powell was the boyfriend of LeeAnn's roommate, Shannon Fairbanks 
(T. 354). LeeAnn's card had been left in the door of Powell's 
Salt Lake City apartment on the night of the robbery (T. 88, 246, 
249-52, 356). LeeAnn and Shannon had called on Powell after 
midnight, not found him home, and left a note for him on the card 
(T. 250-51, 256, 285-86). 
LeeAnn knew Cary Nichols as Powell's friend, and told 
the investigators that Nichols worked for UPS (T. 354-55, 253-
54). She described Nichols and Powell both as dark-haired. 
Because Mouille, the robbed UPS driver, had described the robber 
as blond-haired, the investigators asked if Nichols and Powell 
had a blond-haired friend: LeeAnn promptly gave them defendant's 
name and description (T. 355-56, 254-55).3 
Big Spender 
LeeAnn Leavitt also knew that Powell and defendant each 
drove a new Cadillac Seville. Powell's Cadillac was white; 
defendant drove a silver one (T. 250, 256-57). As it turned out, 
3Shannon Fairbanks, as it happened, had gone target shooting 
with Powell and Nichols some time before the UPS robbery. A 
black, non-revolver pistol, apparently owned by Powell, had been 
used (T. 296-97); this resembled the robber's weapon, seen by 
J.C. Mouille (T. 97). 
6 
the Cadillacs were rented. The white one had been rented by 
Powell the day before the UPS robbery (T. 231). The silver 
Cadillac had been rented by Nichols two weeks before the robbery, 
but it was not returned until after the robbery; defendant was 
listed on the rental agreement as an additional driver of that 
vehicle (T. 234-37). Viewing a photograph of the white Cadillac 
at trial, LeeAnn identified it as the one driven by Powell (T. 
256). Viewing the same photograph, Mike Harris, who had pursued 
the robber from the Ogden UPS center, identified the vehicle as 
resembling the getaway Cadillac (T. 122-23). 
Shannon Fairbanks attended a barbecue shortly after the 
robbery; Powell, Nichols, and defendant were also present (T. 
295). Shannon observed that defendant had apparently just made a 
substantial clothing purchase for his young child, who 
accompanied him to the barbecue (T. 295-96, 310-11). 
Further, on the day after the robbery, defendant paid 
cash, totalling $1620.00, for two suits and other clothing (T. 
304-05). Defendant's employment income at that time, however, 
was very low: he had been employed for about two months as a 
communications equipment salesman, and had only been paid some 
thirty dollars during that time, apparently due to normal delay 
in finalizing sales and paying commissions (T. 219-20, 222). In 
fact, before the robbery, defendant had been borrowing money from 
his employer (T. 221, 223), as well as from one of his brothers, 
with whom he lived (T. 409, 413). 
7 
The Arrests 
Informed of the robbery's circumstances, LeeAnn Leavitt 
and Shannon Fairbanks agreed to assist with the investigation (T. 
260, 287, 357). Investigators placed listening devices in the 
women's apartment. Shannon then called Powell (T. 261, 357); he 
and Nichols came to the apartment, where the women told them 
about the robbery investigation (T. 262, 288). The foursome 
discussed what LeeAnn and Shannon should or should not say to the 
investigators (T. 263-65, 360, 363). The men discussed ways of 
avoiding the police; Powell suggested going to Australia (T. 289, 
365)/ At that point, the listening investigators entered the 
women's apartment and arrested the men (T. 266, 292, 365). 
Upon arresting Powell and Nichols, the investigators 
proceeded to search Powell's apartment (T. 365). There they 
found a trash bag of the apparent same brand and type as the one 
containing the stolen UPS property and LeeAnn Leavitt's business 
card, found at the Provo post office (T. 366-68). Further, while 
the search was in progress, LeeAnn and Shannon, sitting in a 
police car outside the premises, saw defendant drive up in the 
silver Cadillac, apparently survey the situation, and then leave 
(T. 268-72, 292-93). 
Defendant was arrested later that day, at the apartment 
he shared with his two brothers (T. 410-11, 430). The silver 
Cadillac was not then seized; instead, one of defendant's 
4The trial court disallowed any reference to defendant in 
recounting this conversation (T. 265-66, 366, T. 8/20/90 at 5). 
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brothers moved it to a nearby parking lot (T. 411), from where it 
apparently was returned to the rental agency (T. 235-36). 
Eyewitness Identification 
On the day after the arrests, J.C. Mouille was shown a 
photo array containing defendant's picture, but could not 
identify defendant as his robber (T. 106, 110-11). Later, he 
viewed a live, seven-person lineup. At the lineup, Mouille 
selected defendant and another individual for closer scrutiny (T. 
111). Mouille stated that if he had to choose, he would identify 
defendant as the robber (T. 112-13). At trial, the jury heard 
the basis for Mouille's uncertain identification: The robber, 
Mouille testified, had appeared "skinny" because of the way he 
had worn his vest (T. 113). At the lineup, defendant looked 
relatively muscular; Mouille therefore selected defendant, whose 
face looked like the robber's, and the other individual, who 
appeared to be built more like the robber (T. 114-15). 
The Verdict 
Defendant was tried separately from Powell and Nichols 
(R. 14, 17). The conspiracy charge was dismissed after the 
presentation of evidence, but the trial court let stand all 
testimony relating to the robbery conspiracy among defendant, 
Powell, and Nichols (T. 437, 464-66). A pretrial motion to bar 
J.C. Mouille's eyewitness identification testimony had also been 
denied (R. 46-48, T. 8/20/90 at 14-16). However, an instruction 
advising the jury to scrutinize eyewitness testimony very 
carefully, along the lines of State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493-94 
9 
nn.7 & 8 (Utah 1986), was given (R. 84-87; copy appended to this 
brief). On the aggravated robbery charge, a unanimous guilty 
verdict was returned (R. 71, T. 468-69). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has shown neither plain error nor ineffective 
assistance of counsel in jury selection. There was no "palpable" 
error in not challenging a single, possibly police-favoring juror 
for cause, and instead using a peremptory challenge to remove 
that juror. Even if that decision was questionable, defendant 
enjoys no presumption of prejudice. Instead, because there is no 
evidence that the actual trial jury was biased, defendant's jury 
selection argument fails. 
Robbery victim J.C. Mouille was properly allowed to 
testify about his identification of defendant. Defendant's 
reliance on state constitution-based law on this point is 
misplaced, for he raised no state constitutional argument in the 
trial court, and he has made no showing that the law in question, 
issued well after his trial, should apply retroactively. Even 
under that law, Mouille's testimony would have been admissible. 
Finally, the jury was fully apprised of the uncertainties of 
Mouille's eyewitness identification, and was correctly instructed 
to scrutinize his testimony with care. 
Various statements made by one of defendant's alleged 
coconspirators were properly admitted and allowed to stand as 
evidence, even though the conspiracy charge was dismissed. 
Defendant's tie to the robbery scheme was shown by, among other 
10 
things, his connection to a Cadillac rented by one of the 
coconspirators, and by his fingerprint on the card addressed to 
the other coconspirator, found among the discarded robbery 
proceeds. This independent evidence of conspiracy allowed the 
trial court to admit statements made in its furtherance. 
Further, apart from the specific rule allowing admission of 
coconspirator statements, the statements in issue here were not 
hearsay, and therefore were properly admitted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
NEITHER "PLAIN ERROR" NOR "INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL" OVERCOME DEFENDANT'S 
TRIAL-LEVEL WAIVER OF A POSSIBLE FOR-CAUSE 
JUROR CHALLENGE. 
In his first two points on appeal, defendant argues 
that a single prospective juror, Mr. Hodge, should have been 
removed for cause. Hodge stated during voir dire that he 
expected police officers, because of their training, to be more 
accurate observers than lay witnesses (T. 50).5 The trial court 
followed up on this, quizzing Hodge and Mr. Creager, another 
juror who had made a similar statement, about whether they could 
assess truthfulness of police testimony independently, as with a 
lay witness (T. 53-55). Creager answered "I don't think so," and 
was excused for cause (T. 55). Hodge, however, answered "I think 
I can be neutral" (T. 56), and was passed for cause without 
5Hodge was a city building and zoning inspector, and had 
occasionally assisted police investigations by, for example, 
drawing crime scene diagrams (T. 35, 50). 
11 
objection from defense counsel (T. 65). Counsel then used his 
first peremptory challenge to remove Hodge (R. 62). 
A. "Plain Error" and "Counsel Ineffectiveness" Test. 
Recognizing that for-cause juror challenges not made in 
the trial court are normally waived on appeal, see State v. 
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988), defendant argues that it 
was either "plain error" or "ineffective assistance of counsel" 
to pass Hodge for cause (Br. of Appellant at 9, 14). Neither 
argument affords relief from his trial-level waiver. 
The "plain error" and "ineffective counsel" doctrines 
are virtually identical, each involving a two-element test. For 
plain error, the first element requires an error that is 
"obvious" or "palpable." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 & 
n.ll (Utah 1989). As for counsel ineffectiveness, a claimed 
miscue must violate "the wide latitude counsel must have in 
making tactical decisions," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 688-89 (1984). The second element of both tests is the 
same. The "palpable" error, or counsel miscue, must affect the 
trial outcome: that is, absent the error or miscue, "a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result" must exist. 
Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-19 & n.2 (explaining Strickland), 122 & 
n.12 (explaining plain error). With certain exceptions not 
pertinent here, the burden is on the appealing party to prove 
both elements of each test. Id. 
12 
B. No "Palpable" Error or Counsel Miscue. 
Defendant has not carried his burden here. The trial 
court did not "palpably" err in passing juror Hodge for cause. 
To the contrary, it correctly distinguished the accuracy of 
officer observations from officer truthfulness, or honesty, in 
relating those observations.6 Juror Creager, who expressed an 
inability or unwillingness to distinguish these concepts, was 
excused for cause; Hodge, stating his belief that he could be 
neutral on the honesty issue, was legitimately passed for 
cause.7 That trial court decision, based in part upon Hodge's 
demeanor and credibility, is not subject to appellate reversal 
absent clear error. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 
156 (1878) (trial court decision to pass juror for cause is 
reversed only for "manifest" error, where "the law left nothing 
to the 'conscience or discretion' of the court"). 
Nor did trial counsel perform unacceptably in passing 
Hodge for cause. The "accuracy-honesty" distinction regarding 
police testimony, applied by the trial court, could certainly be 
recognized by counsel. In any event, counsel's decision to 
remove Hodge with a peremptory challenge, rather than make a for-
6Regarding the former, this Court has noted that officer 
training and experience provides heightened observational 
accuracy. See State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). 
7This case does not even remotely resemble the situation in 
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), heavily relied upon by 
defendant. There two jurors acknowledged "bitter[ness]" and a 
"very emotional link," respectively, to the case to be tried, as 
past victims of similar crimes, id. at 882. Here juror Hodge 
expressed no such strong emotional feelings. 
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cause challenge, was permissible. State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 
406 (Utah 1986); c^. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 176 (Utah 
App. 1992) (counsel permissibly waived a peremptory challenge in 
order to seat full jury).8 This Court has properly refused to 
condemn trial counsel tactics "simply because another lawyer, 
e.g., appellate counsel, would have taken a different course." 
State v. Jones. 823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 1991). 
C. No Resulting Prejudice. 
Defendant's "plain error" and "counsel ineffectiveness" 
attacks on jury selection can be rejected solely upon his failure 
to show either "palpable" error or a clear counsel miscue. See 
Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-19 (failure to show either element of 
counsel ineffectiveness defeats the claim). Further, defendant 
makes no attempt to show prejudice, or a reasonable likelihood of 
more favorable trial outcome, absent the argued jury selection 
error or miscue. 
In fact, defendant acknowledges that he cannot 
demonstrate actual prejudice, given that the argued error "is in 
the jury selection process" (Br. of Appellant at 13 n.6). 
Instead, he urges this Court to find prejudice on the basis that 
juror Hodge was removed with a peremptory challenge, when in 
defendant's present, after-the-fact opinion, Hodge should have 
been removed for cause. 
8Trial counsel may have even considered seating Hodge. 
Hodge had served on two prior juries, one in a criminal case 
resulting in a hung jury (T. 44-45). This may have been among 
the "numerous factors," Frame, 723 P.2d at 406, figuring into 
counsel's decision to pass Hodge for cause. 
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It is indeed a "well-established" Utah rule that 
forcing a party to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror 
who should have been removed for cause constitutes reversible 
error. State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 642 (Utah 1988). However, 
no Utah case has applied this "automatic prejudice" rule in a 
situation where, as here, the questioned juror was not challenged 
for cause in the trial court. Indeed, application of automatic 
prejudice in this context would effectively gut the waiver rule, 
a rule that, again, clearly applies to jury selection. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 18(c)(2) ("A challenge to an individual juror may be 
made only before the jury is sworn to try the action, [or] before 
any of the evidence is presented"); DeMille, 756 P.2d at 83-85; 
State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983). 
Even where a for-cause juror challenge is made in the 
trial court, and it is subsequently ruled that the challenge 
should have been granted, the United States Supreme Court has 
held that there is no presumption of prejudice. Instead, 
defendant must show that the jury that actually sat was biased. 
See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (juror erroneously 
retained upon for-cause challenge was removed by peremptory 
challenge. Held: no relief required absent showing that jury 
that actually sat was biased).9 In asking to find automatic 
Relieving that the Ross rule has merit, and that the 
"automatic prejudice" rule is based upon questionable logic, the 
State has petitioned this Court to review a recent Utah Court of 
Appeals opinion regarding jury selection. See State v. Kavmark, 
195 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah App. Sept. 16, 1992), petition for 
certiorari No. 920477 (filed Oct. 15, 1992). 
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prejudice here, then, defendant urges a lower threshold for 
reversible unpreserved error than the federal Supreme Court has 
set for preserved jury selection error. This Court should reject 
defendant's urging, and thereby promote the finality of this and 
other criminal judgments where no showing of an unreliable trial 
verdict can be made. 
In sum, defendant has shown neither plain error nor 
counsel ineffectiveness in the selection of his trial jury. 
Accordingly, his present challenge to prospective juror Hodge, 
not raised in the trial court, should be rejected. 
POINT TWO 
THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY OF 
THE ROBBERY VICTIM WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE. 
Relying exclusively on State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991), defendant next argues that the admission of J.C. 
Mouille's eyewitness testimony, identifying defendant at trial as 
the armed UPS robber, was reversible error. For several reasons, 
this argument fails. 
A. Waiver and Non-Retroactivitv of New Law. 
First, Ramirez was not decided until April 1991, well 
after defendant's August 1990 trial. Ramirez established state 
constitution-based criteria for admission of eyewitness 
identification testimony, yet defendant's motion to disallow 
Mouille's testimony advanced no state constitutional ground (R. 
47-48, T. 8/20/90 at 14-16)• He thereby waived any extra 
protection the state constitution might have afforded him. State 
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v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985) (grounds not raised 
in support of pretrial motion to suppress will not be considered 
on appeal absent special circumstances). 
Also, the Ramirez court acknowledged that its "decision 
on this issue breaks new ground under the Utah Constitution," 817 
P.2d at 778, before setting forth new rules for admitting 
eyewitness identification testimony, id., at 780-82. "When a new 
rule of criminal procedure constitutes a clear break with the 
past, it is not generally applied retroactively." State v. Hoff, 
814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991) (citing cases). Defendant has 
made no argument that Ramirez should apply retroactively; 
therefore, he cannot rely on it to reverse the trial court's 
admission of Mouille's eyewitness identification testimony.10 
B. Evidence Sufficient to Support Admissibility. 
Second, it does not appear that any pre-Ramirez case 
clearly required a special evidentiary hearing on the admission 
of eyewitness identification testimony, as seemingly now required 
under Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778 (alluding to "foundation" and 
"preliminary factual findings"). Most significantly, State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), a major Ramirez progenitor, did 
not deal with admissibility of such testimony at all. Instead, 
Long dealt solely with the need for a precautionary jury 
10Had defendant raised such an argument, it would seem to be 
defeated by State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). Long 
requires special jury instructions on the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications. However, that requirement was made 
prospectively applicable only, id. at 492 ("from this date 
forward, trial courts shall give such an instruction . . . " ) . 
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instruction about eyewitness testimony, 721 P.2d at 487-95, 
obviously presupposing admissibility. 
Consistent with pre-Ramirez law, the non-evidentiary 
hearing on defendant's motion to exclude Mouille's eyewitness 
identification testimony, reviewing and proffering preliminary 
hearing evidence on the issue (T. 8/20/90 at 11), was sufficient 
for purposes of deciding admissibility. That hearing gave the 
trial court sufficient information to make its preliminary 
reliability and admissibility determination under Rule 104(a), 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Indeed, despite the eyewitness problems chronicled in 
Long, Mouille's testimony was clearly admissible under Rule 602, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. That rule only requires "personal 
knowledge" of the events in question, meaning that the witness 
must merely have the opportunity and capacity to perceive them. 
State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 33 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 
814 (1989). As did the victim in Eldredae, Mouille, the robbery 
victim here, certainly had such personal knowledge. 
C. Admissibility Under the New Law. 
Third, even if the Ramirez rules for admitting 
eyewitness identification testimony might apply here, the Ramirez 
outcome defeats defendant's argument. Identification of the 
nighttime robber in Ramirez was far more problematic than that 
here. The Ramirez robber was masked, crouched down, and viewed 
from ten to thirty feet away, 817 P.2d at 782; the robber here 
was unmasked, standing at least sufficiently erect to get some 
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idea of his height, and approached within five to six feet of 
Mouille (T. 99, 108-10). Identification of the Ramirez robber 
was hindered by the fact that his accomplice was assaulting the 
eyewitness with a pipe during the robbery, 817 P.2d at 783; here 
Mouille had no such distraction. Defendant Ramirez was also 
subjected to a "blatantly suggestive[]" one-man showup shortly 
after the robbery, id. at 784, an element lacking here. 
Despite these problems and others, and acknowledging 
that they created "an extremely close case," the admission of the 
eyewitness identification testimony in Ramirez was affirmed on 
appeal. 817 P.2d at 784. The admission of Mouille's eyewitness 
identification testimony here, not nearly so close a question, 
would clearly be affirmed under Ramirez, were it applicable. 
Accordingly, the admission of that testimony would also be 
affirmed under less-stringent federal standards. Id. 
D. Lack of Prejudice. 
Finally, defendant cannot complain of being unfairly 
prejudiced by Mouille's eyewitness testimony. The jury was fully 
apprised of the uncertainty of Mouille's identification of 
defendant as the robber. It learned that Mouille had been unable 
to identify defendant from a photo array, and that he had 
hesitantly selected defendant from the live lineup, prior to his 
in-court identification (T. 106, 110-13). The jury was 
instructed in detail, as required in Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493-94 
nn.7 & 8, about its duty to decide the eyewitness reliability, 
and the applicable reliability factors (R. 84-87, copied at the 
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appendix to this brief; compare Long instruction at appendix to 
Br. of Appellant). In closing argument, the prosecutor 
acknowledged the identification problems; defense counsel 
hammered away at them (T. 440-42, 452-53). 
The jury was properly warned, then, to beware of 
Mouille's identification of defendant, and to view it with 
healthy skepticism. All in all, there was neither error in the 
admission of Mouille's identification testimony, nor undue harm 
resulting from that testimony. 
POINT THREE 
STATEMENTS MADE BY ONE OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED 
COCONSPIRATORS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court erroneously 
admitted statements made by Cary Nichols, one of his alleged 
robbery coconspirators, into evidence against him. Some of those 
statements were made during Nichols's visit to the Ogden UPS 
center before the robbery; another statement consisted of his 
inquiry to a UPS co-worker about the handling of money; other 
statements were made during the police-monitored post-robbery 
conversation with LeeAnn Leavitt and Shannon Fairbanks (Br. of 
Appellant at 23-24). Defendant identifies State v. Gray, 717 
P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986), construing Rule 801(d)(2)(E), Utah Rules 
of Evidence, as controlling this issue (the text of Rule 801 is 
appended to this brief). Under Gray, and on other bases, the 
trial court properly admitted Nichols's statements. 
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A. Admissibility Under Coconspirator Statement Rule. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) makes coconspirator statements 
admissible against a criminal defendant as non-hearsay. Gray, 
717 P.2d at 1317. The conspiracy need not even be charged, i^ d. 
at 1318; thus dismissal of the conspiracy charge against 
defendant did not render the coconspirator statements 
inadmissible. To admit such statements, the conspiracy must be 
found to exist, but only by a preponderance of evidence that is 
independent of the statements themselves. J^ i. at 1318-19. Such 
a finding is overturned on appeal only if it is clearly 
erroneous. See id. at 1316. 
When it dismissed the conspiracy charge against 
defendant, the trial court explained that it nevertheless was 
admitting "all of the evidence" of conspiracy previously 
accepted, including the coconspirator statements, for the purpose 
of deciding the remaining robbery charge (T. 465-66). The 
court's finding of a conspiracy, implicit in that ruling, was not 
clearly erroneous. 
Defendant has marshalled much of the independent 
evidence of a conspiracy: he acknowledges Cary Nichols's 
employment at UPS, and Nichols's unusual visit to the Ogden UPS 
center with Troy Powell before the robbery. He acknowledges his 
own friendship with Nichols and Powell, his co-driver status on a 
Cadillac rented to Nichols, and the presence of his fingerprint 
on LeeAnn Leavitt's business card, left at Powell's apartment and 
later recovered among the robbery proceeds (Br. of Appellant at 
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25). Other evidence tending to show a robbery conspiracy, and 
defendant's involvement in it, includes his own after-hours visit 
to the Ogden UPS center before the robbery (T. 142, 176). 
Defendant argues that the foregoing evidence is 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to show conspiracy by a 
preponderance of the evidence. He seems to suggest that because 
no single piece of that evidence, by itself, amounts to clearly 
criminal conduct, or relates actual, articulated robbery plans, 
it cannot independently establish conspiracy (Br. of Appellant at 
26). He points out that in Gray, 717 P.2d at 1319-20, the 
defendant himself made statements about the criminal 
transactions. Also, in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1143-44 
(Utah 1989), the defendant participated in meetings where 
criminal plans were discussed. 
Neither Gray nor Johnson, however, hold that actual 
criminal activity or explicit involvement in criminal planning is 
a required component of the independent evidence needed to admit 
statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy. Nor should this 
Court so hold. By its nature, a criminal conspiracy is conducted 
in secrecy: the enterprise would be doomed at the outset if 
openly planned. Accordingly, evidence of a conspiracy will often 
be indirect and circumstantial, perhaps even innocent on its 
face. Such was the nature of much of the evidence here. 
Considered in its entirety, however, that evidence certainly 
justified a finding that defendant, Nichols, and Powell were, 
jointly, up to no good. Under Gray and Rule 801(d)(2)(E), then, 
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the trial court did not clearly err in admitting statements that 
seemed connected to the probable conspiracy. 
B. Statements Supporting Their Own Admissibility. 
Although it should not be necessary for the purpose of 
affirming the trial court's ruling here, it is worth noting that 
the United States Supreme Court, subsequent to this Court's 
decision in Gray, has construed Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(E) differently from its identical Utah counterpart. In 
Bouriailv v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)f the Supreme 
Court squarely held that under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the threshold 
proof of conspiracy can be satisfied, at least in part, by the 
challenged statements themselves. 483 U.S. at 181. 
Thus, contrary to Gray, the United States Supreme Court 
held that evidence sufficient to make a threshold finding of a 
conspiracy, required to admit coconspirator statements at a 
criminal trial, need not be wholly independent of the statements 
themselves. In so holding, the Court declared that the 
"bootstrapping rule" of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 
(1942), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), relied 
on by this Court in Gray, 717 P.2d at 1318, had been at least 
partly overruled by the modern rules of evidence. Bouriailv. 483 
U.S. at 176-79. 
Were it necessary, then, and if this Court were to 
adopt the Bourlaily analysis, Nichols's statements could also be 
considered in deciding whether a conspiracy was adequately 
proven, and therefore whether his statements were properly 
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admitted. Certainly the content of Nichols's statements here was 
suspicious: for example, he falsely claimed that Powell, who 
accompanied him on an unusual visit to the Ogden UPS center, was 
a new UPS employee (T. 187-89, 337-38). He also made an unusual 
inquiry, before the robbery, about UPS money-handling (T. 216-
17). Such statements might well be expected by one who is 
"casing" premises targeted for a crime. Finally, Nichols's post-
robbery meeting with Powell, LeeAnn Leavitt, and Shannon 
Fairbanks, discussing the police investigation and ways to avoid 
it, also tends to show a robbery conspiracy. 
C. Admissibility as Outside the Hearsay Definition. 
Finally, the coconspirator statements challenged by 
defendant fall outside the definition of inadmissible hearsay, 
quite apart from Rule 801(d)(2)(E). None of those statements was 
offered at trial to "prove the truth of the matter asserted" 
therein, under Rule 801(c). 
Nichols's statement that Powell was a new UPS employee, 
and another statement explaining his own presence at the Ogden 
UPS center, were not offered to prove their truth, for the first 
statement was in fact false, and the other, dubious.11 Thus 
they were not hearsay at all. Similarly, Nichols's inquiry about 
the handling of UPS money was just that—an inquiry, not even a 
"statement" within the meaning of hearsay under Rule 801(a). Put 
uNichols had also explained his presence at the Ogden UPS 
center by saying that he was performing some "hundred weight 
audits," part of his duties. The co-worker to whom he gave this 
explanation found it odd, because of the unusual hour (T. 196). 
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differently, it was the making of the statements or inquiries, 
rather than their particular content, that was the admissible, 
relevant evidence. 
Nor was the post-robbery conversation in LeeAnn 
Leavitt's home, just before the arrest of Nichols and Powell, 
necessarily subject to a hearsay objection. During that 
conversation, Nichols and Powell never admitted involvement in 
the robbery: they discussed the investigation, what the women 
should say to investigators, and ways to evade the police (T. 
262-64, 289, 365). These aspects of the discussion tended to 
show Nichols's and Powell's involvement in the robbery, but 
again, were not actual statements to that effect. 
Because of defendant's close association with Nichols 
and Powell, the post-robbery discussion tended to prove 
defendant's involvement as well.12 Perhaps that discussion 
might have been excluded under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(probative value substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice). 
However, no such objection was made at trial; nor is one pursued 
on appeal. Further, the discussion's impact appears minimal in 
light of all the other evidence, and thus harmless even if it was 
erroneously admitted. See Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(timely objection requirement, and harmless error rule). 
Defendant has not shown clear, prejudicial error in the 
trial court's admission of coconspirator statements that helped 
12It might have been more prouative, but the trial court did 
not allow mention of defendant during the discussion to be 
disclosed to the jury (T. 265-66, 366, T. 8/20/90 at 5). 
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prove his guilt in this robbery. In this respect then, as with 
the other points raised on appeal, his conviction is sound. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed• 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C& day of December, 1992. 
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Attorney Generalf 
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APPENDIX I 
Precautionary Eyewitness Identification Instruction, 
Given to Trial Jury. 
INSTRUCTION NO. I ' 
One of the issues in this case is the identification of 
the defendant as the person who committed the crime. The 
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, 
not only that the crime was committed, but also that the 
defendant was the person who committed the crime. If, after 
considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an 
expression of belief or impression by the witness. To find the 
defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the 
identification witness was insincere, but merely that the 
witness was mistaken in his belief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In 
considering whether the prosecution has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed 
the crime, you should consider the following: 
1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to 
observe the criminal actor? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time the witness 
observed the actor; 
b) the distance between the witness and 
the actor; 
c) the extent to which the actor's 
features were visible and undisguised; 
d) the light or lack of light at the 
place and time of observation; 
e) the presence or absence of distracting 
noises or activity during the 
observation; 
f) any other circumstances affecting the 
witness' opportunity to observe the 
person committing the crime. 
2) Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person 
committing the crime? In answering this question, you 
should consider whether the witness' capacity was impaired 
by: 
a) stress or fright at the time of 
observation; 
b) personal motivations, biases or 
prejudices; 
c) uncorrected visual defects; 
d) fatigue or injury; 
e) drugs or alcohol. 
You should also consider whether the witness is of 
a different race than the criminal actor. Identification by 
a person of a different race may be less reliable that 
indentification by a person of the same race. 
3) Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the 
criminal actor at the time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider 
whether the witness knew that a crime was taking place 
during the time he observed the actor. Even if the witness 
had adequate opportunity and capacity to observe the 
criminal actor, he may not have done so unless he was aware 
that a crime was being committed. 
4) Was the witness' identification of the 
defendant completely the product of his own memory. 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time that passed between 
the witness; original observation and 
his identification of the defendant; 
b) the witness# mental capacity and state 
of mind at the time of identification; 
c) the witness' exposure to opinions, 
descriptions or identifications or 
newspaper accounts, or to any other 
information or influence that may have 
affected the independence of his 
identification; 
d) any instances when the witness, or any 
eyewitness to the crime, failed to 
identify the defendant; 
e) any instances when the witness, or any 
eyewitness to the crime, gave a 
description of the actor that is 
inconsistent with the defendant's 
appearance; 
f) the circumstances under which the 
defendant was presented to the witness 
for identification. 
You may take into account that an identification 
made by picking the defendant from a group of similar 
individuals is generally more reliable than an 
identification made from the defendant being presented alone 
to the witness. 
You may also take into account that 
identifications made from seeing the person are generally 
more reliable than identifications made from a photograph. 
I again emphasize that the burden of proving that 
the defendant is the person who committed the crime is on 
the prosecution. If, after considering the evidence you 
have heard from the prosecution and from the defense, and 
after evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the 
considerations listed above, you have a reasonable doubt 
about whether the defendant is the person who committed the 
crime, you must find him not guilty. 
APPENDIX II 
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 801 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE VIIL 
HEARSAY. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, ofifered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or 
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) 
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influ-
ence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving him; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual 
or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has mani-
fested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a 
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the sub-
ject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter 
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the exis-
tence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection Utah case law, State v. Owena, 15 Utah 2d 123, 
